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Form 163a
8-66SIG Paper: Shorter Range Missile Systems and Future
Longer Range Missile Systems

This paper sets out the alternatives for handling in a draft treaty the issue of shorter range missile systems and the ban on new types of longer range missiles.

Option A: Table a draft treaty text which does not contain specific and detailed provisions beyond the guidance already provided the delegation on shorter range missile systems, or specify a range floor for the ban on new types of longer range missiles.

The section of a draft treaty dealing with shorter range systems could be left entirely blank, or could indicate that constraints will be pursued on shorter range missiles without containing, at this point, specific limitations or citing systems to be limited. With respect to longer range systems, the treaty language could indicate that new missile systems comparable to those prohibited would not be permitted, but this language would not attempt to specify or define such systems at this time.

Discussion

This option would retain maximum negotiating flexibility on the shorter range systems issue in later rounds. Specific provisions relating to the SS-12/22 and SS-X-23 could be more carefully studied and introduced as appropriate. This option would help deflect discussion of Pershing I and is the least likely to draw the German PIs (and thus the FRG) into the negotiation at an early stage. This option could, however, permit the Soviets to assert, at a later stage of negotiations, that the US was introducing new elements when it tabled specific provisions to limit shorter range systems. As long as we hold to such general language, it would avoid prejudicing future US plans for shorter range missile systems, but also allow the USSR similar flexibility.

Option B: Make a specific proposal and provide specific treaty language on shorter range missile systems and on a range floor for the ban on new types of longer range missile systems. This option has two variants for each of the respective issues, set out below.

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General Discussion

Placing specific provisions for these limitations on the table in the first round could enhance our ability to secure eventual agreement to those provisions. The Soviets will be unable to charge that we are introducing new elements into the negotiations. Proposing specific treaty language, however, would expand the focus of the negotiations to issues beyond a ban on longer range systems. This could provide an additional basis for Soviet charges that the US proposals were inequitable, and could at some stage increase pressure to deal with Allied systems, beginning with the German PI.

VariantsShorter Range Systems:

Variant 1) Table draft treaty language limiting Soviet systems only (the SS-12/22 and the S-X-23) to their present numbers and present range capability. Include a freeze on refires.

Discussion

This alternative would freeze the numbers and range of Soviet shorter range missile systems. New replacements for existing systems would be limited to the range of existing systems. This approach could forestall, or at least postpone negotiations on US and Allied shorter range systems. Tabling such provisions would open the US to Soviet charges that its proposals were unbalanced, since they restrict Soviet systems only, ignoring comparable US and German missiles entirely. The delegation has recommended that the US propose that the parties agree to a reciprocal freeze on systems with a range between 400 km and 1000 km, and that this proposal be incorporated into draft treaty text.

Variant 2) Table draft treaty language which proposes reductions to equal ceilings on the SS-12/22, SS-X-23, and the Pershing I at the lowest current level (i.e., 108 launchers, ban on refires).

Discussion

This variant incorporates the principle of equality which is the basis of the US position on longer range systems. It avoids adopting the freeze on shorter range systems of variant

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1 and the delegation's suggestion, which if put forward might undercut our case against the Soviets' proposed moratorium on longer range systems. The ban on refires would also be consistent with the development of our proposal on longer range systems, and could set a desirable arms control precedent. It would be extremely difficult, however, to negotiate about US Pershing Is without drawing FRG Pershing Is into the discussion.

NOTE: Variant 2 and the delegation suggestion are inconsistent with discussion of these issues at the November 12 NSC meeting. A decision to adopt either would need, therefore, to be made at the NSC level.

Future Longer Range Missile Systems

Variant 1) Define 1,000 km range floor above which (and below 5500 km) all missiles would be banned.

Discussion

This range floor approach would eliminate the potential for circumvention through range upgrade of the SS-12/22, or through development of new systems with ranges greater than 1,000 km, no matter what the eventual limits on shorter range systems. Such a range floor could, however, create possible negative precedents for any subsequent INF aircraft negotiations, and could make it more difficult for the US to argue that the overall balance on longer range systems, defined as those over 1,000 km, is heavily in the Soviet favor.

Variant 2) Prohibit the testing and deployment of future land-based INF missiles with a range capability equal to or greater than the shortest range missile banned by the Treaty (i.e., the Pershing II, range 1800 km).

Discussion

This approach maintains the focus on the SS-20 and the long range end of the INF spectrum. It would avoid foreclosing US options for conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges above 1,000 km allowing a more comprehensive study of these possibilities and trade-offs. This approach would also avoid setting undesirable

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precedents for any subsequent negotiations on aircraft. Adoption of this approach would make it necessary to achieve agreement on a prohibition on range upgrade of shorter range systems if a ban on longer range missiles were not to be undermined by deployment of new systems just below the 1800 range floor.

NOTE: Although no agency currently advocates such a course, it would be possible to combine elements of Options A and B. A draft treaty could specify limits on shorter range systems or on new types of longer range systems while leaving blank for the present the section dealing with the other issue.

JCS Footnote

The JCS representative additionally points out that even if a prohibition on future missiles above 1800 km were to establish a precedent for aircraft (a less likely prospect than with a generic range band approach) only the F-111 would be covered on the US side, while the USSR would include the Badger and Blinder. (Based on range capability alone the FB-111 and Backfire would also be covered; however, these aircraft may be more appropriately handled in START). On the other hand, a precedent based on 1,000 km would capture the F-18, F-16, A-6 and A-7 for the US, but only the Fencer for the Soviet Union. The proposal tabled by the Soviet Union on December 1, 1981 would cover systems with a "range (combat radius) of 1,000 km or more"; a clear reference to aircraft. The JCS representative believes that no agency has demonstrated that it would be in the US interest to move toward the Soviet Union position that these negotiations are intended to cover all nuclear arms between 1,000 km and 5500 km.

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